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The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global economy
has attracted great scholarly attention to Chinese corporate
governance. Among the various areas of Chinese corporate
governance, executive compensation is an important yet difficult
part to research. The common research method of the Chinese
executive pay literature relies on pay figures disclosed in listed
companies’ annual reports and tends to take the disclosed numbers
at face value. This Article discusses three informal pay practices
that constrain the usefulness and reliability of executive pay data
formally disclosed in annual reports of Chinese-listed companies,
especially those owned by the state. A valid reading of formal pay
figures entails an understanding of the network structure and the
political environment in which Chinese companies operate. An
investigation of the practices behind formal compensation numbers
sheds light on many issues for scholars and policymakers, the
salience of which escalates as the international interaction with
Chinese companies expands. For example, it stresses the important
role of political institutions in shaping executive compensation;
raises questions about the extent to which international cross-listing
improves transparency of Chinese companies; critically evaluates
whether China’s latest reform policy deals with the real problems of
its state-owned enterprises; and spotlights the lacuna of extant
scholarship on Chinese executive compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
China now ranks second behind the United States in the
number of the world’s largest 2,000 public corporations on the
Forbes list. 1 The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global
economy has drawn great scholarly attention to Chinese corporate
governance.
However, scholars of comparative corporate
governance often observe significant limits of using standard
theories or Western experience to understand Chinese companies.
Among the various areas of Chinese corporate governance,
executive compensation is an important yet difficult part to research.
As the Economist aptly noted years ago, “[h]ow executives are
rewarded is one of the many mysteries of China’s increasingly
powerful companies. Unravelling it is important, not least because
it should help to explain corporate China’s transformation from a
state-controlled to a consumer-driven creature.”2

1 The Forbes Global 2000 is an annual ranking of the world’s top 2,000 public
companies by Forbes Magazine. The ranking is based on a combination of four metrics:
sales, profit, assets and market value. In 2016, the U.S. leads the list with 579 companies,
followed by China (mainland and Hong Kong) with 232. Chinese companies own the top
four spots and split the top ten spots with U.S companies. For the full list, see The World’s
Biggest Public Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall
[https://perma.cc/2PQM-FM83] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
2 Executive Compensation in China: False Options, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12070705 [https://perma.cc/NW3Y-C77U].
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In the past decade, a growing body of literature has tried to
bring Chinese executive pay practices to light. Most studies of
Chinese executive pay follow the conventional approach of Western
compensation literature: taking the publicly-listed firm as the unit of
observation, focusing on the listed firm’s pay figures disclosed in
the annual report, and regressing the dependent variable of the
disclosed pay amount on a set of independent variables, such as
revenues, profits, ownership type, etc. 3 This typical approach
produces useful insights, to be sure, yet it is an under-contextualized
approach to studying Chinese companies, particularly the statecontrolled firms. The approach overlooks the fact that a Chineselisted firm often is a member of a corporate group in which there are
frequent intra-group transactions and personnel overlaps among
member companies. The incentive systems of group-affiliated firms
may be different from those of typical stand-alone firms considered
in the Western executive pay literature. 4 Moreover, this common
approach relying on corporate annual reports assumes that China
has effective enforcement of securities regulations and Chinese
companies have a culture of compliance and truthful disclosure.
This assumption should be accepted with caution. Chinese public
companies and even the government have a notorious reputation of
data manipulation. 5 Big accounting firms in China have been
3
See Section II (The Numbers Scrutinized in the Spotlight) for the review of this
empirical literature.
4 For literature on Chinese corporate groups showing how group affiliation affects
affiliated firm’s financial performance and behavior, see LISA A. KEISTER, CHINESE
BUSINESS GROUPS: THE STRUCTURE AND IMPACT OF INTERFIRM RELATIONS DURING
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2000) (discussing Chinese interfirm relations); Michael Carney
et al., Business Group Performance in China: Ownership and Temporal Considerations, 5
MGMT. & ORG. REV. 167 (2009) (discussing whether group affiliation can improve firm
performance).
5 See Francine McKenna, After China Fraud Boom, Nasdaq Steps up Scrutiny of
Shady Listings, MARKET WATCH (June 20, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
after-china-fraud-boom-nasdaq-steps-up-scrutiny-of-shady-listings-2016-06-20
[https://
perma.cc/Q28E-ZFAU] (reporting that “more than 50 U.S. listed Chinese companies were
either delisted or halted from trading in 2011 and 2012 based on claims of fraud and other
violations of U.S. securities laws”); Johnathan Chew, China Officials Admit They Fake
Economic Figures, FORTUNE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/14/china-fakeeconomic-data/ [https://perma.cc/9SBB-53W3] (discussing the untrue economic data
reported in China); Whether to Believe China’s GDP Figures, ECONOMIST (July 15, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/chinese-economy [https://perma.
cc/3RCV-NRS5] (discussing the issues of China’s reporting of its GDP); Nina Xiang,
Accounting Fraud Is Still Widespread Among Chinese Companies, FORBES (April 16,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ninaxiang/2014/04/16/accounting-fraud-is-still-
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embroiled in scandals involving accounting fraud. 6 As Professor
Donald Clarke notes, “the reality of corporate governance practices
in China remains very different from what appears in the statute
books, and indeed so opaque that it is difficult to measure reliably
where it is, let alone in what direction it is moving.”7 It suggests
nontrivial limits of using the standard methodology to capture the
true picture of executive compensation in China.
This Article focuses on three common practices that
constrain the usefulness and reliability of executive pay data
disclosed in Chinese-listed companies’ annual reports: on-duty
consumption, zero compensation, and nominal versus actual pay. In
particular, this Article collects data to show the striking yet
overlooked zero-pay puzzle presented in Chinse listed companies’
annual reports, where a considerably large proportion of board
members of Chinese-listed firms do not earn any compensation paid
by the listed companies that they serve. To the best of this author’s
knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of the zero-pay
puzzle in extant scholarship. These three compensation practices
lurking behind the formal numbers must be understood against a
backdrop of slack regulation and corporate group structures being
used to support the interests of the Chinese state-owner. China’s
current securities regulations give listed companies freedom to
mystify their top management compensation practices through the
pervasive personnel linkages in a corporate group.
The
mystification particularly serves the interests of the state-owner,
who has been unwilling to relinquish control over the personnel of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
These three compensation practices raise concerns about
data comparability and reliability of Chinese-listed companies’
annual reports. As shown in this Article, the data problems are not
alleviated by cross-listing in better disclosure regimes, such as the
stock exchanges of the United States and Hong Kong. These
widespread-among-chinese-companies/#2eb89f88723e
[https://perma.cc/8R8A-6ZWE]
(discussing accounting fraud in Chinese companies).
6 See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Comm’n (SEC), SEC Imposes
Sanctions Against China-Based Members of Big Four Accounting Networks for Refusing
to Produce Documents (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/201525.html [https://perma.cc/49SK-N2TM] (discussing SEC’s investigation of accounting
fraud in Chinese companies).
7 Donald Clarke, “Nothing But Wind”?: The Past and Future of Comparative
Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 101–02 (2010).
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informal pay practices also raise questions about whether executives
of China’s listed firms are capable of discharging their fiduciary
duties to the listed firms they serve.
Furthermore, observing the pay practices behind the formal
numbers published in corporate annual reports offers a nuanced
view on the perennial scholarly debate about the trajectory of
national corporate governance systems in the age of globalization.
It suggests that politics play an important role in the formal rules
and actual practices of executive compensation. It also offers an
insightful perspective to evaluate China’s recent SOE reform
agenda.
In China, the term “executives” or “top managers” (gaoguan)
usually includes directors, supervisors, the general manager (CEO),
deputy general managers (vice CEOs), the financial officer, the
corporate secretary, and others described in the articles of
incorporation. This common usage considers the fact that directors
and supervisors are usually corporate senior managers. 8 To be
consistent with China’s common usage, “executive compensation”
referred in this Article includes compensation for directors,
supervisors, and other top managers.
This Article is organized as follows. Section I will set out
the existing regulatory framework of executive compensation China.
It helps explain how the formal regulations make the mystification
of executive pay possible. Section II will review existing scholarly
studies of Chinese executive compensation to show what sorts of
pay information are typically examined in existing literature.
Section III will discuss three informal pay practices that render
compensation information disclosed in the corporate annual report
significantly incomplete or misleading.
Finally, Section IV
discusses theoretical and policy implications, as well as questions
for future research.

I.

THE FORMAL RULES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Executive compensation in China is regulated by four legal
sources: the company law, securities regulations for listed
companies, special rules for financial institutions, and rules for
8

Lin Lin, Regulating Executive Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32
J.L. & COM. 207, 212 (adopting the same definition of “executives” in the Chinese context).
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state-controlled firms. An overview of the legal sources provides a
backdrop to understand how actual compensation practices deviate
from the formal rules and how the formal rules play a role in
concealing actual practices.
A. The Company Law
China’s 2006 Company Law is the fundamental legal source
of Chinese corporate governance. A major governance feature
under China’s corporate law is the dual board structure, which
consists of the board of directors and the board of supervisors.
Figure 1 below shows the governance structure under China’s
corporate law. The function of the board of directors is similar to
the board in the Anglo-American corporate system. The board of
directors is responsible for managing the corporation’s business and
affairs, including the appointment of senior officers and the
determination of their compensation. The board of supervisors is
responsible for supervising directors and senior officers in
performing their duties. Both boards are elected by shareholders,
who are entitled to receive periodic disclosure of executive
compensation paid by the company and have the authority to
approve the compensation of directors and supervisors at the general
shareholder meeting.9

9

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭޜਨ⌅) [Company
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 38, 47 [hereinafter Company
Law].
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Figure 1. Governance Structure under China’s Company Law

B. Securities Regulations for Listed Companies
The China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is
the main government agency overseeing listed companies in China.
CSRC’s Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
(2002) suggests that a listed company may establish the
compensation committee to study and review the company’s
remuneration policies for directors and senior officers. 10 It also
suggests that the board of directors should disclose compensation
information to shareholders. In the early 1990s, China’s securities
regulations already required listed companies to disclose executive
compensation in their annual reports, but most listed companies did
not comply with the rules. 11 In 1999, CSRC promulgated a new
rule that required the listed company to disclose in its annual report
the lump sum of compensation paid to its directors, supervisors, and
senior officers. The company was also required to list all the
directors, supervisors and senior officers who did not receive
10

Company Law art. 52, 56, supra note 9; Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (кᐲޜਨ
⋫⨶߶ࡉ) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China] (promulgated
by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n and State Econ. and Trade Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2002).
11 Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (㛑⾘ਁ㹼оӔ᱃㇑⨶Ჲ㹼ᶑֻ)
[Provisional Administrative Regulations on Stock Issuance and Trading] (promulgated by
Decree No. 112 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 22, 1993,
effective as of the same date) art. 59.
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compensation from the company.12 While this disclosure rule had
no compliance problems, the lump sum approach provided very
limited information to understand each individual executive’s
compensation.
The compensation disclosure rules were amended in 2001.13
The 2001 amendment required disclosure of executive pay policies.
Moreover, instead of lumping directors’, supervisors’, and senior
officers’ compensation together, the rules required the listed
company to disclose the sum of the top three paid directors and the
sum of the top three paid officers, respectively. Independent
directors’ compensation should be disclosed on an individual basis.
The listed company was required to list executives who did not
receive any compensation from the company and indicated whether
or not they received any pay from its shareholders or subsidiaries.
This disclosure rule implied that top managers were allowed to be
paid by the listed company’s shareholders or affiliates, rather than
by the listed company itself. Yet, the amount of compensation paid
by the listed company’s affiliates was not subject to disclosure.
In 2005, CSRC amended the disclosure rules, resulting in
mandatory disclosure of each executive’s compensation. 14 The
disclosure scheme included two parts: total compensation and
current equity holdings. Total compensation is the sum of base
salary, bonuses, subsidies, employee benefits, insurance, and other
forms of compensation paid by the company. The rules maintained
the position that the listed company should list executives who did
not receive any pay from the company and indicate whether they
12 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (ޜᔰਁ㹼㛑⾘ޜਨؑᣛ䵢ⲴᇩоṬᔿ߶ࡉ
ㅜҼਧ<ᒤᓖᣕⲴᇩоṬᔿ>) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec.
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999).
13 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (ޜᔰਁ㹼㛑⾘ޜਨؑᣛ䵢ⲴᇩоṬᔿ߶ࡉ
ㅜҼਧ<ᒤᓖᣕⲴᇩоṬᔿ>) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec.
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999, amended by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 10,
2001) art. 26.
14 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (ޜᔰਁ㹼㛑⾘ޜਨؑᣛ䵢ⲴᇩоṬᔿ߶ࡉ
ㅜҼਧ<ᒤᓖᣕⲴᇩоṬᔿ>) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec.
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999, amended by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 26,
2005) art. 26.
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received compensation from the company’s shareholders or
subsidiaries. Still, the amount of compensation paid by the
company’s affiliates remained undisclosed. The most current
disclosure rules (released in 2016) are virtually the same as the rules
of 2005.15
C. Rules for Financial Institutions
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the
Chinese government tightened its control over executive
compensation of the financial sector, which has been dominated by
SOEs. In 2009, the Ministry of Finance placed a pay cap at RMB
2.8 million (approximately U.S. $410 thousand)16 for executives at
state-controlled financial institutions and promulgated rules to
strengthen the link between pay and performance. The China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) also published guidelines
to regulate executive pay practices of China’s financial institutions
(including policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets
management companies, financial cooperatives, and finance
companies), whether state-owned or not. 17 According to the
guidelines, the structure of executive compensation should include
fixed salary, variable pay (i.e., performance-oriented compensation
and short-term and long-term incentives), and benefits (e.g. housing
subsidies). The guidelines set out details of executive compensation
management. For instance, the base salary should be no more than
35% of the total compensation, and 40% of the performance bonus
should be paid on a deferral basis with the deferral period not less
than three years. Financial institutions that fail to comply with the
guidelines would be subject to sanctions imposed by CBRC.

15

Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (ޜᔰਁ㹼㛑⾘ޜਨؑᣛ䵢ⲴᇩоṬᔿ߶ࡉ
ㅜҼਧ<ᒤᓖᣕⲴᇩоṬᔿ>) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec.
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999, amended by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 9,
2016) art. 53.
16 The exchange rate of USD to Renminbi as of Dec. 31, 2009 was 1:6.828. Historic
Exchange Rates, X-RATES, http://www.x-rates.com/historical/?from=USD&amount=1&
date=2009-12-31 [https://perma.cc/2RRQ-6397] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
17 Shangye Yinhang Wenjian Xinchou Jianguan Zhiyin (୶ъ䬦㹼っڕ㯚䞜ⴁ㇑ᤷ
ᕅ ) [Supervision Guidelines on Healthy Compensation of Commercial Banks],
(promulgated by China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Feb. 21, 2010).
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D. Rules for Non-Financial SOEs
At present, China’s largest non-financial SOEs are
controlled by the central or local government’s ownership agency,
known as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC). The large non-financial SOEs under
SASAC’s control are typically organized as vertically-integrated
business groups. Figure 2 illustrates the organizational structure of
a typical business group under SASAC’s control. 18 The parent
company typically is 100% owned by SASAC. Beneath the parent
company are a large number of subsidiaries, including listed firms,
finance companies, research institutes, and many other related firms
along the production chain. Often, there are frequent business
transactions and personnel overlaps among member firms in a group.
Figure 2. Typical Structure of a Non-Financial State-Owned
Group

SASAC is authorized by the State-Owned Enterprise Assets
Act (a special law outside the company law) to determine
managerial compensation of the companies under its direct control,

18

See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013)
(discussing in detail the organization and governance of the business groups under
SASAC’s control).
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i.e., the parent company in Figure 2.19 Since its establishment in
2003, SASAC, in cooperation with relevant government and party
organs, has introduced a series of measures to reform the parent
company’s executive compensation practices. 20 Some important
measures include: managerial compensation structure consisting of
base salary, bonus, and mid-term and long-term incentives that are
linked with corporate performance; executive pay pegged to an
average worker’s pay at certain fixed rate; 21 and using a
sophisticated formula to determine the pay level based on a set of
economic, social, environmental and political indicators.22
Recently, the government’s anti-corruption campaign has
escalated the SOE pay reform. In 2014, the Political Bureau of the
Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, presided by
President Xi Jinping, passed a set of rules to reform SOE executive
pay. 23 Top managers (including directors, supervisors, CEOs and
19

Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa (Աъഭᴹ䍴ӗ⌅) [State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1,
2009), ch. 4.
20 Such regulations are usually promulgated jointly with the Central Organization
Department of the Chinese Communist Party (i.e., the Party’s human resources
department), the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of
Finance, National Audit Office, the Ministry of Supervision and SASAC.
21 According to SASAC’s 2009 guidelines, base salaries should not be more than five
times of SOEs’ average worker’s pay in prior year and performance bonuses should not be
more than three times of base salaries; in other words, the total compensation including
base salaries and performance bonuses should be no more than twenty times the amount of
the SOEs’ average worker’s pay. The original text of the guidelines was never published
to the public. However, a summary and inside information is available in the People’s
Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. Pay for Senior SOE
Executives Capped at 20 Times Average Employee Pay, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Sept. 25, 2009),
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/10113071.html
[https://perma.cc/9686-Y6LQ]
(discussing Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli de Zhidao
Yijian (ޣҾ䘋а↕㿴㤳ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫ㯚䞜㇑⨶Ⲵᤷሬ㿱) [Guidelines Concerning
Further Regulating Executive Compensation of the Central State-Owned Enterprises]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Chinese
Communist Party Central Organization Department, the Ministry of Supervision, the
Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office, and SASAC, Sept. 16, 2009)).
22 Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa (ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫ㓿
㩕ъ㔙㘳ṨᲲ㹼⌅) [Provisional Measures on the Comprehensive Evaluation of Top
Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 29,
2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013).
23 Zhongyang Guanli Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Zhidu Gaige Fangan (ѝཞ㇑⨶Աъ䍏
䍓Ӫ㯚䞜ࡦᓖ᭩䶙ᯩṸ) [Reform Scheme on Executive Compensation of the Central
State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the Communist Party
of China, Aug. 29, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015); Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan
Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Lvzhi Daiyu, Yewu Zhichu de Yijian (ޣҾਸ⨶⺞ᇊᒦѕṬ㿴
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vice CEOs) of the SOEs directly owned by SASAC (i.e. the parent
company in Figure 2) are subject to the new rules. 24 The
government’s reform statement reaffirms the use of performanceoriented pay and prohibits illegal financial income.25
E. Evaluation
The brief overview of China’s executive compensation rules
shows that government intervention is quite direct and pervasive.
Mandatory disclosure, a common form of government intervention
in executive compensation, indeed exists in China. But the depth of
information disclosure is relatively limited compared to the
disclosure standards in advanced capital markets, such as the United
States. Disclosure of each executive’s compensation was not
required until 2005. Still, the scope of executive compensation
remains vague and it does not require disclosure of a breakdown of
compensation composition.
This raises questions about
comparability of compensation data across companies in China.
Another problem involves the fact that executives may
receive compensation only from the shareholders or subsidiaries of
the listed company, not the listed company itself. The regulations
only require the listed company to disclose “whether or not”
executives receive pay from its affiliates.
The amount of
compensation actually paid by the listed company’s affiliates is not
subject to the disclosure requirements. Section III will empirically
show that the business group structure coupled with this regulatory
slack lead to the zero-pay phenomenon, significantly masking the
actual compensation practices in China.
The most silent form of government intervention is that the
state itself directly determines the pay level in SOEs. As discussed
above, the government has imposed a maximum amount of
㤳ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫን㙼ᖵ䙷ǃъ᭟ࠪⲴ㿱) [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly
Regulating Position-Related Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers
of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the
Communist Party of China, Aug. 29, 2014).
24 While the rules are applicable to the SOEs under SASAC’s control, the government
explicitly encouraged all central and local SOEs adopt similar rules. As a result, many
local governments recently have taken similar steps to curb executive pay at their SOEs.
25 While a brief summary of the pay reform policy has been released by the
government, until today the full text of the rules has not been released.
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executive compensation on SOEs. Moreover, under the StateOwned Enterprise Assets Act, the state-owner grants itself the
power to determine not only directors’ compensation, but also
compensation of senior officers, such as CEOs and vice CEOs. In
other words, the state-owner has a super control right that is not
available under corporate law, under which shareholders have
authority to determine director remuneration yet the board of
directors approves compensation for senior officers.
In fact, the state-owner not only legitimizes its intervention
through the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act—its involvement is
more penetrating than what it appears to be on the face of the law.
As Section III will show, SASAC’s compensation power effectively
reaches down to the listed subsidiaries, rather than being restricted
to the parent company as stated in the law. By leveraging the
complex corporate group structure and complementary disclosure
rules, the state-owner effectively conceals actual SOE compensation
practices notwithstanding mandatory disclosure of each executive’s
compensation paid by the listed firm.

II.

THE NUMBERS SCRUTINIZED IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Empirical analysis is essential in understanding executive
compensation. Without compensation data, it is impossible to
symmetrically observe pay levels, composition, and the relationship
between pay and performance.
Both Western and Chinese
executive pay literature mainly use empirical methods to analyze
executive remuneration data. As discussed in Section I, starting in
1999, China’s listed companies began to disclose the amount of
compensation paid to the three highest-paid directors and the
amount of compensation paid to the three highest-paid senior
officers. Starting in 2005, companies should disclose in their annual
report the amount of compensation paid to each director, supervisor
and senior officer. These disclosure rules triggered the takeoff of
Chinese executive pay research.
Existing Chinese executive pay literature, both in Chinese
and English, typically concerns two related empirical questions:
whether there is a positive relationship between pay and firm
performance; and if so, what the determinants of pay-performance
sensitivity are. The existing studies tend to find a positive
relationship between executive pay and performance, while
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significance and magnitude of the positive linkage vary with
performance measures and sample periods.
Often, studies
investigate how corporate governance attributes such as ownership
concentration, ownership identity (e.g., state-owned or not), and
board structure (e.g. board size, number of independent directors)
affect the pay level and pay-performance sensitivity, and the results
seem inconclusive.26
Regardless of their research questions, all such studies need
to measure executive compensation. This Article focuses on the
studies published in English-language scholarly journals. A
summary of pay variables and data periods in major Englishlanguage studies of Chinese executive compensation is provided in
the Appendix. The summary is not intended to serve as a
comprehensive literature review but to show existing studies’
common approaches to measuring executive compensation.
As shown in the Appendix, early studies relied on survey
data to examine Chinese SOEs’ executive compensation practices in
the 1980s. The sample companies in these early studies were nonlisted companies because China’s stock exchanges had not been
established until the early 1990s. All of the other studies focus on
listed firms, and their study periods start from 1999 or later, due to
data made available under mandatory compensation disclosure.
Most of the existing studies focus on cash compensation (i.e. salary
and bonus) rather than equity, as Chinese-listed firms rarely use
equity incentives. The pay variable of studies covering the years
prior to 2005 is typically measured as the sum or the average of the
three highest-paid senior officers or directors; the pay variable of
studies that focus on 2005 or after use individual executive pay.
This measurement pattern reflects data availability under the
disclosure rules.
Most of the studies included in the Appendix focus on cash
compensation, while only a few studies examine perquisites.
Perquisites typically include housing subsidies, travel
reimbursement, entertainment expenses, etc.
The limited
investigation of perquisites is due to the fact that Chinese-listed
companies are not required to disclose such information.
No matter how scholars measure executive compensation
(cash, equity, or perks), they typically take the listed firm as a stand26

See infra Appendix.
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alone unit of analysis. Executive compensation is analyzed as an
outcome of the listed firm’s internal governance, such as the
percentage of independent directors on the board, chairman-CEO
duality, the existence of compensation committee, or shareholder
identity (e.g. state or non-state).
Overall, empirical studies focus on cash compensation
disclosed in corporate annual reports. While this approach produces
insights, there remain great limitations of understanding actual
managerial compensation practices of Chinese-listed companies.
As Section III will show, there are simultaneously under-, over-, and
non-reporting problems in Chinese-listed firms’ executive
compensation disclosure. The numbers disclosed in the corporate
annual report should be taken cautiously, rather than at their face
value.

III.

THE PRACTICES HIDDEN IN THE SHADOW

This section analyzes three disclosure practices peculiar to
Chinese ownership structure and compensation regulations that
mask actual executive pay of Chinese-listed companies, particularly
state-controlled firms. The first practice is the non-disclosure of
perks, or so-called “on-duty consumption.” The second practice is
the zero-compensation phenomenon where a large number of
directors and supervisors do not receive any compensation from the
listed company they serve. The third practice concerns the gap
between actual and nominal pay. Because some existing studies
have recognized on-duty consumption, this Article will give a brief
discussion of its institutional causes. Attention will be focused on
the other two practices that are overlooked in the extant literature.
A. On-Duty Consumption
On-duty consumption (zaizhi xiaofei) is an important source
of income for Chinese SOE executives. It involves various benefits
enjoyed as a result of one’s position. Typical benefits include
housing allowance, personal use of corporate cars, shopping
vouchers, travel expenses, and entertainment expenditures. The true
amount of perk consumption is difficult to estimate because China’s
listed companies are not required to disclose such information.
Even when disclosed, perk consumption is likely underreported or
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significantly obscured. A conservative estimate suggested that
perks could range between 15% and 32% of the total executive
compensation in China.27 Another study suggested that the average
managerial perks could be as high as eight times the average cash
pay.28
Despite the significance of perks in Chinese executive
compensation, very few studies focus on them because of a lack of
data. Chinese-listed companies are not required to disclose
information on executive perks. Less than 50% of the listed firms
voluntarily disclosed such expenses. Even when they did, the
disclosed information was in a lump-sum format, where outsiders
could not distinguish legitimate corporate operating expenses from
managerial personal benefits.29 Therefore, most scholars focus on
observable data (i.e., salary and bonus) rather than the unobservable
(i.e., perks).
The use of on-duty compensation in SOEs traces back to the
traditional compensation system. Before the economic reform
starting in the 1980s, all enterprises were state-owned and managers’
compensation was subject to the civil service pay system. The
system was based on egalitarianism, in which there were little salary
differentials between ordinary workers and high-rank employees.30
Yet government employees above a certain rank could receive
considerable rank-specific perks. While in 1985 the SOE pay
system was separate from the government pay system, on-duty
consumption remains as a significant hidden pay component for
SOE executives. Because on-duty consumption is off-sheet income
and subject to little monitoring, it has been criticized as a major
source of corruption in the SOE system. The Chinese government
very recently in the anti-corruption campaign made high-profile
regulations to restrain the abuse of on-duty consumption in the
27 Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and
Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 54 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 945, 961 (2006).
28 Donghua Chen et al., Do Managers Perform for Perks?, SSRN (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562003 [https://perma.cc/CF8P-4VYP].
29 Martin J. Conyon et al., Organizational Slack, CEO Turnover and the Horizon
Problem in China, SSRN (Mar. 10, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2355744 [https://perma.cc/Q79S-HMNB], n. 3 (arguing the limits of using
voluntarily disclosed perk-related expenditures to estimate the true amount of perks).
30 See Hon S. Chan, How Are They Paid? A Study of Civil Service Pay in China, 77
INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 294 (2011) (discussing China’s civil pay system).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2

156

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

SOEs. The regulatory rules limit the scope of on-duty consumption
to certain qualified expenditures.31 The effects of the recent rules
are questionable, given that similar regulations have already been in
place for a decade.32
Critically speaking, the government’s existing reform of onduty consumption has only scratched the surface of the problem.
The fundamental problem of on-duty consumption lies not in
extravagant expenditures, but in the government’s (specifically the
Chinese Communist Party’s) unwillingness to release its control
over SOE personnel. This author’s previous work has shown that
the Chinese government frequently rotates people between
government bureaus and SOEs to control the management of
SOEs. 33 The common personnel linkages inevitably make
government officials a group of peers for SOE executives. As a
result, an SOE executive’s pay is implicitly benchmarked against
the pay of a government official of equivalent rank, whose pay
structure has a very low salary but considerable perks. 34 As
mentioned above, the amount of on-duty consumption is rankspecific, depending on one’s administrative rank (xingzheng jibie) in
the government system. For example, ministers enjoy the perks of
the ministerial level. Since 1999, the Chinese government has made
several regulatory attempts to abandon administrative rank for SOEs,
but the rules have been effectively disregarded.35 For example, the
31 Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Lvzhi Daiyu,
Yewu Zhichu de Yijian (ޣҾਸ⨶⺞ᇊᒦѕṬ㿴㤳ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫን㙼ᖵ䙷ǃъ᭟
ࠪ Ⲵ  㿱 ) [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly Regulating Position-Related
Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned
Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Aug.
29, 2014). In the Opinions, position-related treatments include the use of corporate
vehicles, corporate housing, and training (including training at the Chinese Communist
Party School and administrative academy but explicitly excluding MBA or EMBA tuition).
Business-related expenses include expenses for customer entertainment, travel, and
telecommunication.
32 Guanyu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Zhiwu Xiaofei de Zhidao Yijian (ޣҾ㿴
㤳ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫ㙼⎸䍩Ⲵᤷሬ㿱) [Guidelines on On-Duty Consumption of Top
Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Jun. 8, 2006,
effective Jan. 1, 2007).
33 Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive
Career Approach, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743, 743 (2013) (investigating the career
paths of CEOs at Chinese SOEs and finding that generally more than 20% of CEOs spent
some time in government bureaus before their CEO appointments).
34 Chan, supra note 30, at 302.
35 The 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution to
abandon administrative ranks for enterprises and their top managers. Guanyu Guoyou
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largest five state-owned banks and the largest three state-owned oil
companies hold vice-ministerial rank in the government system.36
The use of administrative rank in SOEs allows a unified career
platform for government officials and SOE managers. It efficiently
interprets the meaning of a transfer (promotion, lateral move or
demotion) and associated benefits for a rotation between SOEs and
other government units. While the legal pay of an SOE executive is
higher than that of an equivalent-rank official, it is significantly
lower than that of executives of privately-owned or foreign
enterprises, another peer group for compensation determination.
This sharp pay gap might instigate a feeling of unfairness and
prompt SOE executives to unscrupulously extract personal benefits
from covert on-duty consumption. As opposed to the clandestine
Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (ޣҾഭᴹԱъ᭩䶙઼ਁኅ㤕
ᒢ䟽བྷ䰞仈Ⲵߣᇊ) [Resolution on Several Important Questions Concerning SOE Reform
and Development] (promulgated by the 15th Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of
China, Sept. 22, 1999). In 2000, the State Council also issued a notice to abandon
administrative ranks for SOEs. However, the government decisions were not actually
implemented. This was also true for listed SOEs. In 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
conducted a survey of the SOEs listed on the stock exchange to investigate whether the
executives retained any administrative rank. The result showed that about 60% of
executives of the listed central SOEs retained administrative rank. See SHANGHAI
ZHENGQUAN JIAOYISUO YANJIU ZHONGXIN (к⎧䇱ࡨӔ᱃ᡰ⹄ウѝᗳ) [SHANGHAI STOCK
EXCHANGE RESEARCH CENTER], ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI BAOGAO (2006): GUOYOU
KONGGU SHANGSHI GONGSI ZHILI (ѝഭޜਨ⋫⨶ᣕ(2006): ഭᴹ᧗㛑кᐲޜਨ⋫⨶)
[CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT (2006): THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE
HOLDING LISTED COMPANIES] (2006). Very recent news reports also suggest that
administrative rank remains a living institution in SOEs. See Nie Huihua (㙲䖹ॾ),
Zhongguo Guanyuan Jibie de Zhengzhi Luoji (ѝഭᇈઈ㓗࡛Ⲵ᭯⋫䙫䗁) [The Political
Logic of Chinese Government Officials’ Administrative Rank], FIN. TIMES (CHINESE) (Sept.
8, 2015), http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001063796?full=y [https://perma.cc/683GXDNQ] (discussing different political rankings in China); Hanshue Suo (㍒ሂ䴚), Guozi
Gaoguan Diaoyan: Chao 99% Buyuan Fangqi Xingzheng Jibie Huan Gaoxin (ഭ䍴儈㇑䈳
⹄˖䎵 99%нᝯ᭮ᔳ㹼᭯㓗࡛ᦒ儈㯚 ) [A Survey on SOE Executives Shows 99%
Unwilling to Give Up Administrative Rank for Higher Compensation], CHINA BUS.
JOURNAL (Sept. 1, 2014), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140830/003920165299.shtml
[https://perma.cc/M925-59UM] (reporting a survey result by the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security of China); Xingjie Chen (䱸ޤᶠ), Feichu Guoqi Lingdao
Xingzheng Jibie? Dou Ni Wan’er (ᓏ䲔ഭԱ亶ሬ㹼᭯㓗࡛˛䙇⧙[ )ݯAbandoning
Administrative Rank in SOEs? Just Kidding], SOHU FINANCE (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://business.sohu.com/s2013/others786/ [https://perma.cc/T5KK-JEW5] (discussing the
unachieved goal of abandoning administrative ranks in SOEs).
36 Zhang Dayan, Jiexi Yangqi Yibashou: Qian 54 Jia Duowei Fubuji (䀓᷀ཞԱаᢺ
˖  ᇦཊѪ䜘㓗) [Analysis of the Heads of Chinese State-Owned Companies:
Most Heads of the Top 54 Companies Are Vice-Ministerial Level], GLOBAL TIMES (June 3,
2013), http://china.huanqiu.com/politics/2013-06/3997084.html [https://perma.cc/2LAAGFUK].
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nature of on-duty consumption, salary at public companies offers
relatively limited room to maneuver because salary is formally
budgeted and is disclosed to the public. Any pay reform short of
actual delinking of the SOE personnel from the civil service system
is ineffective in curing the endemic problem of on-duty
consumption in China’s SOEs.
B. The Zero-Pay Puzzle
In China, like the United States, the public discourse on
executive compensation is focused on excessive pay. While
Chinese executives are paid only a fraction of the compensation
earned by their Western counterparts,37 the public outcry over high
executive pay is by no means less furious in China. As discussed in
Section I, the Chinese government recently has taken measures to
slash executive compensation in SOEs.
High executive
compensation is ill-tolerated in China not simply because of the
weak connection between pay and performance, but more
importantly, the worsening of social inequality and corruption. A
high salary becomes something not for an executive to be proud of,
but to be questioned. Highly paid executives now may even stand
in the spotlight of shame.
In contrast to eye-catching high compensation, pay as low as
zero has been largely unnoticed in the literature. A perusal of the
compensation data in the corporate annual reports reveals that a
significant number of top managers particularly directors and
supervisors report their compensation as zero. These zero-pay
executives do not receive any compensation in cash or equity from
the listed company that they serve. This section first presents the
data on the scale of the zero-pay phenomenon and then it explains
the underlying causes and implications.

37

In 2014, the average CEO pay at listed firms in China was 2.03 million RMB
(approximately 326 thousand USD). Top 10 Mainland CEOs with Best Pay, CHINA DAILY
(July 28, 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2015-07/28/content_21424926.
htm [https://perma.cc/D2VH-HF76]. The average CEO pay of S&P 500 firms in the
United States was $13.5 million. See Executive Pay Watch, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.
org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2015 [https://perma.cc/AKJ4-LA52] (last visited Jan. 13,
2017).
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1. The Scale of the Zero-Pay Phenomenon
This Article collects executive compensation data and
relevant information from the 2014 annual reports of the companies
listed on China’s two stock exchanges: the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 38 The dataset
includes 2,621 listed companies. Table 1 shows compensation and
shareholding data by ownership type and management position.
The zero-pay phenomenon exists mainly for directors and
supervisors, rather than CEOs. Still note that 6% of the CEOs of the
SOEs controlled by the central government do not earn any
compensation paid by the listed companies they serve. In contrast
to CEOs, zero-pay directors and supervisors are strikingly prevalent.
Table 1 shows that 65.3% (61.2% + 4.1%) of the central SOE
chairmen, 40.6% (36.2% + 4.4%) of the local SOE chairmen, and
12.1% (8.8% + 3.3%) of the non-SOE chairmen are unpaid by the
listed companies they serve.
Table 1. Compensation and Shareholding by Ownership Type
and Management Position
Central SOEs

Local SOEs

Non-SOEs

CEOs
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

84 (25.3%)
228 (68.7%)
0 (0%)
20 (6.0%)
332(100%)

148 (24.1%)
443 (72.1%)
2 (0.3%)
21 (3.4%)
606(100%)

872 (57.1%)
615 (40.3%)
3 (0.2%)
35 (2.3%)
1525(100%)

Chairmen
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

28 (8.2%)
90 (26.5%)
14 (4.1%)
208 (61.2%)
340 (100%)

123 (18.9%)
264 (40.5%)
29 (4.4%)
236 (36.2%)
652 (100%)

953(59.9%)
444 (27.9%)
53 (3.3%)
140 (8.8%)
1590 (100%)

38 This Article used TEJ, a commercial database that contains comprehensive
information about ownership and executive compensation of China’s listed companies.
Moreover, this Article directly extracted information from corporate annual reports to
confirm data accuracy. In China, there are many free online financial databases that
provide comprehensive information of Chinese-listed companies. The annual reports in
this Article were downloaded from Sina.com and Stockstar.com. The data were compiled
and analyzed with the assistance of computer programs. The listed companies published
their 2014 annual reports sometime in 2015. Data collection for this Article was completed
in January 2016.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2

160

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

Independent Directors
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

4 (0.3%)
1032 (87.5%)
0 (0%)
144 (12.2%)
1180 (100%)

7 (0.3%)
1963 (88.5%)
2 (0.01%)
246 (11.1%)
2218 (100%)

14 (0.3%)
4430 (90.1%)
1 (0.02%)
441 (9.0%)
4886 (100%)

Other Directors (Excluding
Chairmen and Independent
Directors)
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

169 (9.8%)
573 (33.3%)
55 (3.2%)
922 (53.6%)
1719 (100%)

373 (11.4%)
1485 (43.6%)
87 (2.7%)
1325 (40.6%)
3260(100%)

2626 (39.3%)
2522 (37.7%)
274 (4.1%)
1268 (19.0%)
6690 (100%)

Supervisors
Pay + Shareholding
Pay + No Shareholding
No Pay + Shareholding
No Pay + No Shareholding
Total

100 (6.8%)
721 (48.9%)
24(1.6%)
629 (42.7%)
1474 (100%)

230 (8.2%)
1513 (54.2%)
62(2.2%)
988(35.7%)
2793 (100%)

940 (18.1%)
3299 (63.6%)
93(1.8%)
854(16.5%)
5186 (100%)

The zero-pay phenomenon is much less visible among
independent directors. Among the independent directors of the
central SOEs, only 12.2% of them receive no compensation. A
slightly lower percentage is shown among the local SOE chairmen
(11.2%) and among the non-SOE chairmen (9.2%).
The
compensation of independent directors has been fairly standardized,
in which independent directors typically receive a fixed amount of
cash payment, with an average (excluding zero-pay independent
directors) of about 72,000 RMB a year. 39 The zero-pay
phenomenon is not a result of independent directors as unpaid
volunteers.
For other directors (i.e. directors excluding chairmen and
independent directors), the zero-pay phenomenon is evident in the
data. More than 56% of such directors in the central SOEs, 43% in
the local SOEs, and 23% in the non-SOEs receive no compensation.
Similar to directors, 44.3% of the central SOE supervisors, 37.9% of

39

The average amount is calculated based on the 7,488 paid independent directors in
the author’s dataset.
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the local SOE supervisors and 18.3% of the non-SOE supervisors
earn no compensation.
Overall, Table 1 shows that a significant percentage of
directors and supervisors of the listed SOEs, particularly those
controlled by the central government, report zero in compensation.
Moreover, most of the zero-pay managers (including directors,
supervisors and CEOs) do not have any shareholdings, which
suggests that the zero-pay phenomenon is not a result of
shareholdings as a substitute for compensation.
Table 2 further shows the distribution of zero-pay boards of
directors by ownership type. A significant portion of listed
companies, particularly those controlled by the central government,
demonstrate a board composed of a majority of zero-pay directors.
For example, among the 343 central SOEs, sixty companies (17%)
have a board in which between 51% and 60% of the directors on the
board do not earn any compensation or hold any shares in the listed
company. Table 2 shows that approximately 27% of the listed
companies controlled by the central government have a board
dominated a majority of zero-pay directors.40 This is 15% for local
SOEs and only 3% for non-SOEs.
Table 2. Structure of the Board of Directors, by Ownership
Type

Percentage of NoPay Directors on
the Board
0-10%
11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%
51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%
Total

40

Central SOE
Boards

Local SOE Boards

Non-SOE Boards

31 (9%)
32 (9%)
48 (14%)
66 (19%)
68 (20%)
60 (17%)
22 (6%)
10 (3%)
5 (1%)
1 (0%)
343 (100%)

133 (20%)
104 (16%)
112 (17%)
100 (15%)
111 (17%)
63 (9%)
25 (4%)
12 (2%)
3 (0%)
1 (0%)
664 (100%)

781(49%)
370 (23%)
186 (12%)
116 (7%)
77 (5%)
40 (2%)
13 (1%)
4 (0%)
8 (0%)
6 (0%)
1601 (100%)

In Table 2, 27% = 17% + 6% + 3% + 1%.
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Similarly, Table 3 shows the distribution of the pay
structures of the supervisory boards. Again, it clearly shows that the
zero-pay boards are mainly concentrated in the state-controlled
firms—47% of the central SOEs and 30% of the local SOEs have a
supervisory board whose majority is zero-pay supervisors.
Table 3. Structure of the Board of Supervisors, by Ownership
Type

Percentage of NoPay Supervisors
on the Board
0–10%
11–20%
21–30%
31–40%
41–50%
51–60%
61–70%
71–80%
81–90%
91–100%
Total

Central SOE
Boards

Local SOE Boards

Non-SOE Boards

57 (17%)
23 (7%)
5 (1%)
80 (23%)
16 (5%)
62 (18%)
88 (26%)
5 (1%)
0 (0%)
7 (2%)
343 (100%)

167 (25%)
50 (8%)
14 (2%)
195 (29%)
32 (5%)
76 (11%)
113 (17%)
7 (1%)
2 (0%)
8 (1%)
664 (100%)

1049 (66%)
37 (2%)
8 (0%)
286 (18%)
10 (1%)
23 (1%)
172 (11%)
4 (0%)
0 (0%)
12 (1%)
1601 (100%)

2. Causes and Implications
The large number of zero-pay directors and supervisors, as
shown above, warrants an exploration of underlying reasons and
implications. Why are there so many no-pay directors and
supervisors? Is their compensation really zero as reported in the
annual report?
The zero-pay phenomenon cannot be adequately explained
without looking into the network in which the listed firm is
embedded. While ostensibly a large number of directors and
supervisors are unpaid by the listed companies they serve, they are
actually paid by the controlling shareholders or other corporate
affiliates. As noted in this author’s previous work, the typical
approach to the study of Chinese corporate governance takes the
listed firm as a stand-alone unit of analysis. 41 This approach
certainly generates insights, but it ignores the important fact that
41

Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 18.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

2016]

BEHIND THE NUMBERS

163

business groups are pervasive in China and the listed firm is just a
subsidiary embedded in a web of corporate entities, as earlier
illustrated in Figure 2.
One feature of Chinese business groups is that there are
frequent personnel interlocks among member firms in a group. Top
managers of a member firm such as a listed firm often occupy top
management positions of other member firms (often non-listed
firms) in the same group. Such personnel interlocks complicate
executive compensation within the group. China’s securities
regulations require the listed company to explicitly state in its
annual report whether or not each of the top managers receives any
compensation paid by its shareholders or other affiliates.42 Table 4
summarizes the number and percentage of top managers who are
not paid by the listed company but instead paid by the listed firm’s
shareholders or subsidiaries, according to the data disclosed in the
2014 annual reports.
Table 4. Whether Zero-Pay Managers Paid by Shareholders or
Subsidiaries

Zero-Pay CEOs
Paid by Shareholders or
Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders
or Subsidiaries
Total
Zero-Pay Chairmen
Paid by Shareholders or
Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders
or Subsidiaries
Total
Zero-Pay Directors
(excluding Chairmen)
Paid by Shareholders or
Subsidiaries
Not Paid by Shareholders
or Subsidiaries
Total

42

Central
SOEs

Local SOEs

Non-SOEs

Total

7 (35%)

6 (26%)

4 (11%)

17(21%)

13 (65%)

17 (74%)

34 (89%)

64(79%)

20 (100%)

23 (100%)

38 (100%)

81(100%)

112 (50%)

157 (59%)

97 (50%)

366 (54%)

110 (50%)

108 (41%)

96 (50%)

314 (46%)

222
(100%)

265 (100%)

193 (100%)

680 (100%)

473 (42%)

779 (47%)

587 (30%)

1839 (39%)

648 (58%)

871 (53%)

1397 (70%)

2916 (61%)

1121
(100%)

1650 (100%)

1984
(100%)

4755 (100%)

See supra Part I, Section B (Securities Regulations for Listed Companies).
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309 (47%)

594 (57%)

429 (45%)

1332 (50%)

344 (53%)

456 (43%)

518 (55%)

1318 (50%)

653
(100%)

1050 (100%)

947 (100%)

2650 (100%)

Table 4 suggests that many of the zero-pay top managers are
paid by the listed companies’ affiliates. It shows that 21% of the
zero-pay CEOs, 54% of the zero-pay chairmen, 39% of the zero-pay
directors (excluding chairs), and 50% of the zero-pay supervisors
are paid by the listed company’s affiliates, instead of the listed
company itself. Still, these numbers based on the annual reports are
significantly underestimated. The concept of “affiliates” is broadly
defined in China’s company law, yet in practice, Chinese companies
improperly narrow the scope of the definition and thus underreport
compensation by affiliates. 43 The paying affiliates usually are
controlling shareholders (i.e. parent companies). A typical example
is as follows: The chairman (Zhou Jiping) of PetroChina, an SOE
listed on the Shanghai and the New York Stock Exchanges, earned
no compensation paid by the listed company itself but rather by the
parent company that is wholly owned by SASAC.
Zhou
According to Section 217 of China’s Company Law, affiliate relationships include
the company’s relationships with the controlling shareholder, the actual controller,
directors, supervisors or senior officers; or any direct or indirect control relationship with
the company; any other relations that may transfer the company’s interests; state-controlled
companies are not affiliates simply because of they are owned by the state. Company Law
art. 217, supra note 9. The controlling shareholder is any shareholder who owns more than
50% of the company’s shares or any shareholder who owns less than 50% but holds
enough votes to influence the decisions of the shareholder meeting. The actual controller
is anyone who is not a shareholder but holds enough influence through equity or
contractual relations with the company to influence the company’s behavior. Despite this
broad legal definition, companies in practice limit affiliates to the direct controlling
shareholder (i.e. the parent company) when reporting whether executives are paid by
affiliates. Thus, if an executive is a senior manager of and paid by the parent’s controlling
shareholder or affiliates controlled by the same parent company, it would go unreported.
A prominent example is the chairman of China United Network Communications
Ltd., Chang Xiabing, has been reported since 2004 in the annual reports that he earned no
compensation paid by the listed firm or its affiliates. However, Chang was reported in the
annual reports of China Unicom that he was paid by China Unicom, an affiliate listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. China United Network and China Unicom belong to the
same business group, are owned by the same parent company, and China United Network
is an indirect controlling shareholder of China Unicom. Moreover, there are overlaps in
their top management personnel. This is just one example. In my data collection process, I
noticed that it is fairly common that companies fail to report compensation by affiliates.
43
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simultaneously as the chairman of the parent company was subject
to SASAC’s pay decision. His compensation was decided behind
closed doors by SASAC, rather than by the governance institutions
(i.e. the board of directors and shareholder meetings) of the listed
company.44 This pay arrangement is unobservable from the annual
report, unless one understands the corporate network and how
SASAC wields its control over executive compensation. But even if
the listed company honestly discloses whether or not each of its top
managers earns compensation paid by its affiliates, the
compensation remains a myth to the public, as the regulations do
not require any disclosure of the amount paid by the corporate
affiliates.
The corporate group structure and the disclosure rules
together nicely serve the interests of the state-owner. Chinese SOE
executive compensation, often riddled with corruption, is a
politically sensitive issue that the state-owner has been trying to
keep in secrecy. However, it is becoming difficult to maintain
secrecy for listed companies because of the increasing demand for
transparency in the corporate governance world. It is fair to say that
the zero-pay phenomenon is a temporary balance between the stateowner’s (or the ruling elite’s) secrecy interests and the demand of
convergence on internationally-accepted disclosure rules. While
Chinese regulators adopt the rule requiring disclosure of each top
manager’s compensation paid by the listed company, they allow the
listed company to hide compensation in its corporate affiliates
without violating the disclosure rule.
This information-hiding strategy permitted by China’s
domestic securities rules is not effectively mitigated by cross-listing
to international capital markets. Table 5 shows the number and
percentage of zero-pay managers of the eighty-eight Chinese
companies with shares listed both on domestic and international
stock exchanges. It shows that 8% of the CEOs, 41% of the
chairmen, 31% of the directors (excluding chairmen), and 34% of
the supervisors of the Chinese cross-listed companies report zero in
compensation paid by the listed firm they serve. As previously
discussed, these zero-pay managers are actually paid by the listed
company’s affiliates an amount not publicly disclosed. Most of
these zero-pay companies are state-owned, including high-profile
44

Lin & Milhaupt, surpa note 18, at 742–743.
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firms such as PetroChina, Sinopec, Chalco, and many others
simultaneously listed on the Shanghai and the New York Stock
Exchanges. The Chinese state-owner’s interest in mystifying
executive
compensation
remains
unharmed
despite
internationalization of the listed firms. The limited role of
international cross-listing in bringing transparency to executive
compensation of Chinese cross-listed firms partly relates to the
regulatory fact that foreign issuers often enjoy lots of disclosure
exemptions and often compliance with the listed company’s
domestic rules would be deemed sufficient.
The zero-pay
phenomenon persistent in cross-listed Chinese companies offers
another piece of evidence to question whether cross-listing delivers
any real positive effects on Chinese firms.45
Table 5. The Zero-Pay Situation Among Firms with Shares
Listed Overseas

CEOs
Chairmen
Directors (Excluding
Chairmen)
Supervisors

Total Number of
Managers
(a)

Number of ZeroPay Managers
(b)

87
85
863

7
35
270

Percentage of
Zero-Pay
Managers
(b)/(a)
8%
41%
31%

409

138

34%

A practical implication of the zero-pay phenomenon is that
any measures of top management compensation of Chinese-listed
companies should be taken with great caution. For example, as
shown in Table 6 below, the average compensation varies
significantly with the inclusion or exclusion of the zero-pay
managers. Unfortunately, existing literature on Chinese executive
compensation does not make it clear whether the sample includes or
excludes zero-pay managers.46

45 See Donald Clarke, The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies: Is It
Real? (George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2015-55, 2015)
(discussing the effect of cross-listing on Chinese companies.).
46 None of the studies reviewed in Appendix articulates whether it includes or
excludes zero-pay executives in its data analysis.
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Table 6. Average Pay Differences If Zero-Pay Managers
Included or Excluded

Chairmen
Directors
(Excluding
Chair)
Supervisors

Including
Zero-Pay
[a]
545,249
(2,596)
217,179
(20,061)

Excluding
Zero-Pay
[b]
739, 635
(1,914)
285,286
(15,272)

Difference
(RMB)
[b-a]
194,386

Difference
(%)
[(b-a)/a]
35.7%

68,107

31.4%

185,681
(9,499)

258,100
(6,834)

72,419

39%

Note: Number of managers in brackets.
Fundamentally, the zero-pay phenomenon raises doubt over
top managers’ ability to act in the best interest of the listed company.
The standard approach to the study of executive compensation
views pay as a solution to the agency problem. Compensation
schemes are to provide directors and officers with efficient
incentives to loyally pursue the interests of the company that they
serve. But the loyalty to the listed company may be in jeopardy
when directors and officers are not compensated by the listed
company itself but by its controlling shareholder; what is worse is
that the amount of compensation is a black box to the public. This
hidden pay arrangement may exacerbate the central governance
problem in concentrated ownership structure—controlling
shareholders exploit minority shareholders. As this author recently
noted in a co-authored work on China’s state capitalism, the stateowner “seeks to maximize a range of benefits extending from state
revenues to technology prowess and from soft power aboard to
regime survival at home.” 47 In the eye of the state-owner, the
individual listed firm’s financial interests are subordinate to the
country’s interests as defined by the ruling elite. Pay by the
controlling shareholder rather than the listed firm itself reinforces
this interest preference.
Finally, the zero-pay phenomenon calls for rethinking the
meaning of executive compensation in the Chinese context. The
compensation disclosed in the annual report is the amount legally
47

Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 18, at 746.
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approved by the board of directors and/or the shareholder meeting.
It is a legitimate financial incentive given to executives. However,
are Chinese SOE managers really motivated by the legitimate pay or
more by something else? 48 China’s SOE system is full of rentseeking opportunities for top managers. Financial gains are not
necessarily in the form of legal compensation but illegal payments
such as bribes. 49 Political career advancements may be another
form of incentive. 50
If they are motivated by executive
compensation, companies should fill in the blank spaces of
compensation tables in the annual report. But if they are actually
not motivated by executive compensation, then the disclosed pay in
the annual report, regardless of the amount, does not matter much
and leaves a black hole of what to be disclosed to investors.

48 This question is vividly illustrated by the recent comment by the former chairman
of China Mobile, Wang Jianzhou, a SOE listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock
Exchanges. In the Summer Annual Meeting (known as Summer Davos) of the World
Economic Forum, held in September 2015, Wang as chairman of the Association of
China’s Listed Companies commented on executive pay cuts and stated, “To be honest, top
managers of large SOEs and large enterprises consider a lot of things everyday as they
manage tens of thousands of employees and they do not really care about the level of
personal executive pay.” Wang Jianzhong: Daxing Guoqi Fuzeren Dui “Xianxin” Zhende
Butai Zaiyi, (⦻ᔪᇉ˖བྷරഭԱ䍏䍓Ӫሩ”䲀㯚”ⵏⲴнཚ൘) [Wang Jianzhong:
Large SOE Executives Not Worried about Limiting Compensation], CAIJING MAGAZINE
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20150909/3964095.shtml [https://perma.cc/
4NDW-F8KS].
49 It was reported that SOE executives accounted for 76% of the 605 cases of
entrepreneurs as criminals for the year of 2015 alone. The top three crimes for SOE
executives were bribery (278 cases), corruption (66) and embezzlement (21). The cases
have been increasing over the past years. 2015 Niandu Zhongguo Qiyejia Fanzui Baogao
(Meiti Yangben) Pilu Qiyejia Fanzui Tedian (2015 ই䜭ѝഭԱъᇦ⣟㖚ᣕ˄Ⴢփṧᵜ˅
ᣛ䵢Աъᇦ⣟㖚⢩⛩) [2015 Criminal Report of China’s Entrepreneurs reveals the
criminal patterns and tendencies of Chinese entrepreneurs], LEGAL DAILY (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2016-04/05/content_6551886.htm?
node=5955 [https://perma.cc/M8GJ-D5AH]. The report is an annual publication starting in
2009 by Legal Daily, Legal Weekly, and China Youth Daily to track criminal records of
Chinese entrepreneurs.
50 Jerry Cao et al., Political Promotion, CEO Compensation and Their Effect on Firm
Performance, SSRN (Nov. 16, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1512142 [https://perma.cc/VW7S-DHPN] (showing that “both monetary and political
incentives are positively related to firm performance” and moreover “the monetary
compensation-based incentive is weaker when CEO incentives are heavily driven by
political career concerns”).
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C. Nominal Versus Actual Pay
For a company to report that it has paid no compensation to
its executives is intuitively suspicious and should be subject to close
scrutiny.
Still, ostensibly reasonable compensation figures
disclosed in the corporate annual report can be misleading,
particularly for Chinese SOEs. The amount of pay disclosed in the
annual report may be a nominal rather than actual amount paid to
SOE managers, and the gap between nominal pay and actual pay
can be very large.
The nominal versus actual pay practice traces back to the
overseas listing wave among Chinese SOEs in the 1990s. It was
created as an expedient solution to the disparity between the pay
level allowed in China’s state-owned sector and the pay level
demanded in the international capital market. On the one hand,
executive compensation of Chinese SOEs traditionally was
shockingly low by international standards. The low pay could raise
a red flag on Chinese firms’ governance quality and could
negatively affect their initial public offering (IPO) price and
subsequent corporate value in the international capital market. On
the other hand, international pay practices, especially stock options
that often drive compensation high, were incompatible with the
traditional pay system of Chinese SOEs, whose top managers were
often government officials and their pay was benchmarked against
civil service pay. In the face of the institutional clashes, Chinese
SOEs contrived the appearance of adopting Western-style
compensation schemes to alleviate the market concerns while at the
same time clandestinely making informal arrangements with their
top managers to maintain the state’s control over compensation. A
recent study suggests that stock options granted to executives of
Chinese SOEs listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, many of
which are also on the New York Stock Exchange, are “merely
window dressing” to satisfy the taste of foreign investors. 51
Executives of Chinese-listed SOEs are never allowed to freely
exercise stock options shown in corporate annual reports, and even

51 Zhihong Chen et al., Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled
Chinese Firms Listed in Hong Kong Genuine Compensation? 88 ACCOUNTING REV. 1547,
1549 (2013).
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if exercised, they are expected or required to surrender the gain to
the parent company.52
The nominal versus actual pay practice is further
institutionalized by SASAC’s compensation management beyond its
legal authority. SASAC is legally authorized to manage executive
compensation of the companies under its direct ownership (i.e., the
parent company rather than the listed subsidiary in Figure 2). In
reality, SASAC’s compensation management power effectively
reaches down to the listed subsidiary. Top managers of the listed
subsidiary who are also executives of the parent company are in fact
subject to SASAC’s pay decisions, which effectively override the
pay approved by the board of the listed company. 53 Available
information indicates that the actual compensation approved by
SASAC and paid to the executives can be very different from
(usually considerably less than) the nominal pay disclosed in the
annual report.54 This important fact (that many SOEs do not receive
52

Id. at 1556.
Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 18, at 742–743.
54 The actual and nominal pay disparity sometimes may be observed in an
inconspicuous footnote of an annual report. For example, Poly Real Estate (a listed central
SOE) disclosed in a footnote of its 2012 annual report that “according to the compensation
system approved by the board of directors, the chairman (SONG, Guangju)’s total
compensation for the fiscal year of 2012 should be 2.8 million; however, according to
SASAC’s decision, the pre-tax actual pay is 605 thousand dollars.” The company’s 2013,
2014, and 2015 annual reports stated in a footnote that “the chairman’s compensation was
unavailable for disclosure because SASAC had not yet completed the annual performance
review for the chairman.”
For central SOEs, CNOOC Ltd, which is one of the largest state-owned oil
companies in China and is listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, is the
most representative case. CNOOC’s annual reports disclosed that several of its top
managers were paid multi million dollars (RMB) annually, which aroused public anger in
2009. In response, CNOOC clarified that since the first day of the listings in 2001, all the
top managers had agreed to donate the pay approved by the board of directors to the parent
company and they actually received the amount determined by SASAC rather than the
amount published to the public. According to CNOOC, the difference between the actual
pay and the nominal pay was like “the sky and the earth.” Zhonghaiyou Huiying Qianwan
Nianxin: Shiji yu “Mingyi” Shouru You Tianrangzhibie (ѝ⎧⋩എᓄॳзᒤ㯚:ᇎ䱵о”
ѹ”᭦ޕᴹཙ༔ѻ࡛)[CNOOC Reply to Ten Million Annual Pay: Actual and Nominal Pay
Like
Sky
and
the
Earth],
XINHUA
NEWS
(Apr.
14,
2009)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-04/13/content_11180853.htm
[https://perma.cc/X5UE-FQMW] (reporting the public explanation made by CNOOC’s
spokesman). CNOOC’s statements were consistent with information given by SASAC’s
officials in interviews. Guoziwei Zhuanjia: Qiye Laozong Nianxin Duowei 40 Wan Wu
Baiwan Nianxin (ഭ䍴ငуᇦ˖ཞԱ㘱ᙫᒤ㯚ཊѪ 40 з ᰐⲮзᒤ㯚) [SASAC Experts:
Annual Executive Pay at Central SOEs often 400 Thousand Dollars, No One Over One
Million], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY (Sep. 21, 2009), http://business.sohu.com/20090921/
53
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the pay disclosed in the annual report but rather a pay internally
determined by SASAC) is sometimes downplayed as a footnote in
the annual report or buried in obscure corporate documents. More
often, it is entirely unstated.
How SASAC determines SOE executive compensation is
opaque, though it has published some rules regarding its
compensation policy. According to the published rules, the basic
structure of managerial compensation includes three parts: base
salaries, performance bonuses, and mid-/long-term incentive
compensation. Briefly speaking, the base salary is a function of the
size of the enterprise, the difficulty level of managing the enterprise,
the responsibilities undertaken, and the average worker’s pay of the
given enterprise, the given industry, and the given city where the
enterprise is located. 55 Managers receive base salaries monthly.
The structure and payment of performance bonuses are based on a
much more complicated formula in which political loyalty to the
Chinese Communist Party is a factor.56 The performance bonus is
n266867391.shtml [https://perma.cc/BHA8-4EB2] (reporting that SASAC cites SOE
executive pay generally at 400 thousand yuan and not over one million yuan).
For local SOEs, Huayuan Property is a case which was widely reported. Since
2008, the company had disclosed in its annual reports that its chairmen (Ren Zhiqiang)
earned more than 7 million RMB. In the face of the public outcry over the excessive
compensation, the company released a formal statement in 2010 explaining Ren’s
compensation composition and it flagged the fact that Ren’s compensation was determined
by SASAC and for the fiscal year of 2009, the amount approved by SASAC was less than
700,000 RMB, only one tenth of the disclosed amount in the annual report. Huayuan
Dichan Gufen Youxian Gongsi Chengqing Gonggao (ॾ䘌ൠӗ㛑ԭᴹ䲀ޜਨ▴)ޜ
[Huanyan Property Public Announcement], SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH. (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/ [https://perma.cc/99XS-XV9K]
(clarifying Ren Zhiqiang’s compensation.)
55 SASAC published a formula for use in calculating managerial compensation. For
the CEO or chairman of the enterprise, formula is: W = W0*L*R. W indicates the base
salary. W0 indicates five times of the average worker’s pay in state-owned enterprises
nationwide in the past year. L indicates a combination index including the assets size,
industry, profits, etc. R indicates a value between 1 and 1.4 determined by SASAC.
Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Zanxing Banfa Shixing Xize (ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫ
㯚䞜㇑⨶Ჲ㹼⌅ᇎᯭ㓶ࡉ) [Implementation Detailed Rules for Provisional Measures
on Compensation Administration of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises]
(promulgated by SASAC, June 11, 2004).
56 See Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa (ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓
Ӫ㓿㩕ъ㔙㘳ṨᲲ㹼⌅) [Measures on Performance Evaluation of Top Managers of the
Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 29, 2012) (stating the
provisional measures on performance evaluation of top managers of central state-owned
enterprises); Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi he Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia
Banfa ( ѝ ཞ Ա ъ 亶 ሬ ⨝ ᆀ ઼ 亶 ሬ Ӫ ઈ 㔬 ਸ 㘳 Ṩ 䇴 ԧ  ⌅ ) [Measures on the
Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Top Management Teams and Top Managers of

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2

172

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

contingent on the annual performance evaluation and the three-year
term review. 57 However, how the SOE executives are actually
evaluated and paid under these formal rules remains unclear.

IV.

IMPLICATIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH

A. Implications for Comparative Corporate Governance
Scholarship
The central theme of comparative corporate governance
scholarship seeks to explain the variance of governance systems
around the world. Among various factors, politics has been
recognized as a key explanation for different national governance
regimes. 58 Nevertheless, the mainstream approach to executive
compensation pays limited attention to politics. Most recent studies
of executive compensation have relied on optimal contracting
theory or managerial power theory, both of which are developed
with a focus on the U.S. experience.59 Optimal contracting theory
assumes that boards are able to bargain with managers and get
optimal contracts for shareholders’ interests. Managerial power
theory, however, argues that the level and structure of executive
compensation are not shaped by efficient contracting but rather
distorted by rent-seeking managers who are able to capture board
members to set their own compensation. However, as leading
executive pay scholar Kevin Murphy critically commented on the
U.S. executive pay literature,
Most recent analyses of executive compensation
have focused on efficient-contracting or managerialpower rationales for pay, while ignoring or
the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 30, 2009) (stating the
performance evaluation criteria of top management teams of central state-owned
enterprises).
57 Id.
58 Mark Roe has been a leading advocate for the importance of politics in shaping
corporate governance systems. MARK ROE, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 63 (2003) (discussing the
importance of politics in corporate governance).
59 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006) (criticizing optimal
contracting theory and offering an alternative view, managerial power theory).
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downplaying the causes and consequences of
disclosure requirements, tax policies, accounting
rules, legislation, and the general political climate. A
central theme of this study is that government
intervention has been both a response to and a major
driver of time trends in executive compensation over
the past century, and that any explanation for pay
that ignores political factors is critically
incomplete.60
This observation is truer in the Chinese context. Scholars of
Chinese executive compensation, like their U.S. counterparts,
follow the two prevailing theories. However, they are certainly
aware of the important role of government intervention given that
the most important enterprises in China are state-owned. More
often than not, the scholars treat government intervention as
equivalent to binary independent variables of state ownership (i.e.,
whether or not the firm is owned by the state) or top managers’
political connections (i.e., whether or not the firm’s top managers
are former or incumbent government officers). This Article adds a
new dimension of government influence through the lens of
disclosure rules. China’s disclosure regulations give controlling
shareholders great latitude in maneuvering executive compensation
reporting and ultimately mask the true numbers of executive pay of
publicly listed companies. The ruling elite’s interest in limiting
public scrutiny over its SOE personnel management remains largely
unharmed despite ostensibly mandatory disclosure of each
individual executive’s compensation under the securities regulations.
The disclosure regime well serves the interests of the state-owner
(or the ruling elite).
Another issue that relates to comparative corporate
governance scholarship is the perennial debate about the future
trajectory of national corporate governance systems in the era of
globalization. Will they converge on a universal model or will they
continue to retain their national characteristics? For executive
compensation, its convergence question essentially asks whether
60 KEVIN MURPHY, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There,
in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE, 211, 211–356 (George M. Constantinides
et al. eds., 2013).
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there is “Americanization” of executive pay—the prevalent use of
performance-oriented pay and lucrative compensation.61 On its face,
China seems to present “formal convergence” 62 in the sense that
China’s recent regulations explicitly advocate for performanceoriented pay (such as cash bonuses and stock options), a key feature
of the U.S. pay paradigm. Moreover, empirical evidence based on
the formal numbers disclosed in the annual reports of China’s listed
companies show that while executives earn only a fraction of
compensation paid to American executives, their compensation has
been rising swiftly.63 While the recent formal rules and formal pay
figures show some changes toward U.S. standards, informal
practices (including on-duty consumption, zero-pay practice, and
nominal-actual pay divides) place a cautionary note on the
substantive meaning of the converging formal rules and formal pay
figures.
Related to the convergence debate, the informal pay
practices offer an illustration of pay reform and “institutional
complementarity,” 64 a concept used by scholars of comparative
corporate governance to describe that institutions are resistant to
change due to institutional interdependence.
As previously
discussed in Section III, the informal pay practices are important
institutions complementary to the government’s peculiar personnel
management in which there are frequent rotations between the
government bureaus and SOEs. The personnel linkages across the
government and the SOE sector facilitate the formation and
implementation of national economic policy and promote coalition
61 Brian Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of
Executive Pay, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 233 (2004).
62 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (defining “formal convergence” as convergence of rules
on the books).
63 See Alex Bryson, John Forth & Minghai Zhou., Same or Different? The CEO
Labour Market in China’s Public Listed Companies, 124 ECON. J. 90 (2014) (finding that
the average total cash and bonus compensation for a top executive in 2010 was equivalent
to U.S. $129,399, and that pay has doubled between 2005 and 2010).
64 The leading work using “institutional complementarities” to compare political
economies is Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 1st ed. 2001) (stating that any political
economy is composed of several institutions such as corporate governance, labor markets,
etc., and that such institutions become functionally complement over time with the result
that the institutions are stable and difficult to change).
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among the ruling elite. Because SOE executive pay is inextricably
tied to personnel appointments, any significant change to the pay
institution requires a functional adjustment of its interconnected
appointment institution. The government’s recent SOE reform
policy, as discussed below in detail, suggests that the
complementarity of executive pay and personnel appointment
institutions makes pay reform more challenging.
B. Implications for Reform Policy
In recent years, executive compensation has become high on
the Chinese SOE reform agenda. The Chinese government has
promulgated many rules to curb excessive executive pay at SOEs.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, China’s Ministry of
Finance imposed a policy where the maximum pre-tax pay at statecontrolled financial institutions would be 2.8 million RMB.65 More
recently, amid the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the
government declared that the base salary for central SOE executives
is equal to twice the average worker’s pay. Annual performance
bonuses should be no more than twice the base salary, and on-duty
consumption should be constrained.66 Local-government SOEs are
65 Jinrong lei Guoyou he Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Banfa (䠁㶽
㊫ ഭ ᴹ ઼ ഭ ᴹ ᧗ 㛑 Ա ъ 䍏 䍓 Ӫ 㯚 䞜 ㇑ ⨶  ⌅ ) [Administrative Measures on Top
Managerial Compensation of State-Owned and State-Controlled Financial Enterprises]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Jan. 13, 2009). For a summary, see Guanyu
Jinrong lei Guoyou he Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Youguan Wenti de
Tongzhi (  ޣҾ 䠁 㶽 ㊫ ഭ ᴹ ઼ ഭ ᴹ ᧗ 㛑 Ա ъ 䍏 䍓 Ӫ 㯚 䞜 ㇑ ⨶ ᴹ  ޣ䰞 仈 Ⲵ 䙊 ⸕ )
[Regarding the Notice on Issues Pertaining to Top Managerial Compensation of StateOwned and State-Controlled Financial Enterprises], MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/2009niancaizhengbuwengao/caizh
engwengao2009dierqi/200904/t20090413_132166.html [https://perma.cc/C2QV-CYF9].
For information about the rules, see Jinronglei Guoyouhe Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren
Xinchou Guanli Tongzhi (䠁㶽㊫ഭᴹ઼ഭᴹ᧗㛑Աъ䍏䍓Ӫ㯚䞜㇑⨶䙊⸕) [Notice of
the Administrative Measures on Top Managerial Compensation of State-Owned and StateControlled Financial Enterprises], PEOPLE.CN (Feb. 9, 2009), http://finance.people.com.cn/
GB/1040/8771812.html [https://perma.cc/MY5A-B5BU] (stating the administrative
measures on managerial compensation for state-owned and state-controlled financial
enterprises). Regarding pay caps, see Jinrong lei Guoqi Fuzeren Nianxin Ni 280 Wan
Fengding Zuidi 2.5 Wan (䠁㶽㊫ഭԱ䍏䍓Ӫᒤ㯚ᤏ 280 зሱ亦 ᴰվ 2.5 з) [Pay for
Top Executives at State-Owned Financial Enterprises Capped at 2.8 Million RMB, Lowest
25,000 RMB], XINHUA (Feb. 9, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-02/09/
content_10785439.htm [https://perma.cc/36YL-AG3N].
66 Zhongyang Guanli Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Zhidu Gaige Fangan (ѝཞ㇑⨶Աъ䍏
䍓Ӫ㯚䞜ࡦᓖ᭩䶙ᯩṸ) [Reform Scheme on Executive Compensation of the Central
State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the Communist Party
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subject to similar policies as well.67 Overall, the pay reforms to date
have been focused on the substantive components of compensation
rather than the decision-making process and transparency.68 Indeed,
transparency is particularly challenging in China’s political
environment. Disclosure of SOE executive pay may intensify the
public’s outrage against economic inequality and political
corruption. It touches a nerve with China’s ruling elite who are
dreadful of any threat to social and political stability. Furthermore,
as shown in this Article, even though mandatory disclosure rules of
executive compensation are in place, it does not necessarily lead to
transparency when misrepresentation is actually orchestrated by the
government out of its own political interests, and gatekeepers
including lawyers and auditors give way to this political reality.
The transparency reform of executive compensation in China
requires not just releasing numbers to the public but information
credibility verification and truthful disclosure culture.69 Otherwise,
the disclosed numbers would be just whatever the company (or the
state-owner) wants them to appear to the public.
In late December 2016, SASAC for the first time disclosed
executive compensation of the 111 SOEs under its control. 70 As
noted, many zero-pay managers of the listed companies are actually
paid by the parent companies under SASAC’s control. This
disclosure initiative fills some information gaps in the zero-pay
puzzle. According to the released data, the highest pre-tax pay in
of China, Aug. 29, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015); Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan
Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Lvzhi Daiyu, Yewu Zhichu de Yijian (ޣҾਸ⨶⺞ᇊᒦѕṬ㿴
㤳ѝཞԱъ䍏䍓Ӫን㙼ᖵ䙷ǃъ᭟ࠪⲴ㿱) [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly
Regulating Position-Related Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers
of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the
Communist Party of China, Aug. 29, 2014).
67 Id.
68 Tellingly, even the reform rules themselves have no transparency. The government
has never published the text of the rules but only publicly disclosed a brief summary of the
reform policies. While rumors in the news suggest that the government will soon disclose
SOE executive compensation in detail, no progress in this regard has been detected.
69 SASAC officials have sometimes informally disclosed fragmented information
about SOE executive compensation in news interviews. However, this informal way of
disclosure has no comparability and reliability.
70 SASAC, Guowuyuan Guoziwei Guanli Qiye Fuzeren 2015 Niandu Xinchou Xinxi
Pilu (ഭ䲒ഭ䍴င㇑⨶Աъ䍏䍓Ӫ  ᒤᓖ㯚䞜ؑᣛ䵢) [Announcement of the
Compensation of Corporate Persons in Charge under SASAC Management in 2015] (Dec.
29, 2016), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85463/n327265/n327406/n327425/c2513588/content.
html [https://perma.cc/X38V-3745].
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2015 was $1.2 million RMB and the executive pay was often
between $500,000 and $800,000 RMB. 71 Although this recent
disclosure initiative is an encouraging move towards transparency,
such disclosure suffers a significant time lag and faces credibility
challenges.72
It is fair to say that all the “behind the numbers” problems
are essentially rooted in China’s peculiar personnel management
system. The Chinese Communist Party as the visible hand governs
the SOE executive labor market. Top managers of important SOEs,
like government officials, are evaluated and appointed by the Party.
In this personnel system, SOE (formal) executive pay is
benchmarked against civil servant pay and significantly lower than
the market rates for corporate executives. As a result, SOE
executives have incentives to lavishly use on-duty consumption as a
way to compensate for this difference. The state-owner (ultimately
the Party) has an interest in maintaining its personnel control and
secrecy by practicing zero-pay reporting and nominal-actual pay
gap. The Party’s retreat from SOE personnel management is the key
to successful compensation reform of Chinese SOEs. Unfortunately,
at this point, the Party remains unwilling to relinquish this power.
While in recent years the government has experimented with the
idea of recruiting top managers from outside the state sector, this
author’s recent empirical research shows that the executive labor
market of China’s SOEs remains virtually closed to those who are
outside the state system. 73 Part of the reason for the absence of
professionals recruited outside the state system is that the pay is too
low compared to the prevailing market rate. To handle this problem,
the Chinese government is experimenting with a dual pay system
for SOEs. Under the system, the compensation of executives whose
careers develop within the state system is unilaterally set by
SASAC’s evaluation, while those recruited from outside are paid
based on market rates through contract negotiation. The latter
71

Id. The chairman and CEO of the China Merchants Group received the highest pay.
SASAC disclosed the 2015 pay at the end of 2016. Its disclosure time is not
contemporaneous with annual reporting of listed companies. Moreover, the low executive
pay reinforces the common belief that Chinese SOE executives do not reply on formal pay
but other sources of income (“gray income”).
73 Li-Wen Lin, Balancing Closure and Openness: The Challenge of Leadership
Reform in China’s State-Owned Enterprises, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 133 (Benjamin L. Liebman &
Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015).
72
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compensation is usually much higher than the former. It is unclear
whether such dualism will work well—anecdotal evidence indicates
that it can brew resentment among those whose pay is subject to
SASAC’s relatively low pay policy.74
C. Questions for Future Research
The primary research methodology used in executive
compensation literature is quantitative analysis of the compensation
data disclosed in formal corporate reports. The validity of this
research approach is built on the premise that the numbers published
on paper fairly reflect the compensation practices in effect. This
premise is appropriate when corporate governance institutions are
competent and efficient. However, it should be used with great
caution when dealing with data regarding China, since the capital
market remains relatively immature there. Also as scholars of
Chinese law commonly note, the gap between the law on the books
and the law in action is often considerably large in China. To be
sure, it is unwarranted to entirely deny the credibility of information
disclosed in the annual reports of China’s listed companies, yet it
does reasonably suggest the limitation of statistically crunching
numbers to understand the true practices of Chinese corporate
governance, including executive compensation. Future empirical
research should conduct surveys and interviews to get deeper
insights in order to fully understand the operation of executive
compensation in the Chinese context.
The findings in this Article suggest another lacuna of
existing empirical research on Chinese executive compensation:
business groups as a missing variable. A Chinese-listed firm is
often part of a business group and some studies have investigated
how the business group structure may influence a Chinese firm’s
financial performance and accounting behavior.75 Yet most existing
74 See Yangqi Quanqiu Pin Gaoguan Sicheng Laizi Xitong Nei Guoziwei Fouren
Neiding (ཞԱ⨳ޘ㚈儈㇑ഋᡀᶕ㠚㌫㔏ഭ䍴င䇔ᇊ) [Forty Percent of the
Central SOE Executives Recruited Worldwide Are from Inside the System], BEIJING NEWS
(May 16, 2011), http://news.sohu.com/20110516/n307579006.shtml [https://perma.cc/
Y9XB-9SEF] (interviewing a SOE CEO who was offered to pay at market rate but
declined the offer and accepted the lower pay policy because of the potential resentment
concern).
75 See, e.g., Jia He et al., Business Groups in China, 22 J. CORP. FIN. 166 (2013)
(investigating business groups in China); Lisa A. Keister, Interfirm Relations in China:
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studies of Chinese executive compensation lack the variable of
business group and tend to treat the listed firm as a stand-alone unit.
How the business group structure may influence Chinese executive
compensation is an important topic to be explored. A very recent
study found that executive compensation of a Chinese-listed
subsidiary is correlated with the performance and compensation of
another listed subsidiary in the same business group.76
Furthermore, the zero-pay phenomenon raises some specific
questions to be investigated in the future. For instance, does the
lack of financial compensation really impair managers’ capability to
satisfy their fiduciary duties? Empirically, do companies with a
higher percentage of zero-pay directors or supervisors on the board
demonstrate inferior financial performance, more frequent relatedparty transactions, more sanctions by securities regulators, or any
other undesirable behavior? Positive answers lend some support to
the concerns about fiduciary duties while negative answers lead to
further inquiries about any other mechanisms that may effectively
align board members’ interests with the listed company even when
they are not paid by the company at all.

V.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, Chinese executive compensation has
received considerable media and scholarly attention. News media
have annually broadcasted answers to questions such as who are the
highest paid CEOs. The academic world has heatedly debated
whether there is an excessive pay problem. The government has
taken high-profile measures to slash SOE executive compensation.
Yet, a more than two-decade-old comment on American executive
compensation in the Harvard Business Review seems apt for the
Group Structure and Firm Performance in Business Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1709 (2009) (discussing group structure and firm performances in China); Lisa A. Keister,
Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China’s
Transition Economy, 104 AM. J. SOC. 404 (1998) (discussing the relationship between
business group structure and firm performance in China).
76 Guilong Cai & Guojian Zheng, Executive Compensation in Business Groups:
Evidence from China, 9 CHINA J. ACCOUNT. RES. 25 (2016) (finding that “when the change
in performance of one subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries, the change in
its executive compensation is significantly lower. Further, when the business group is
private and the level of marketization is high, the subsidiary’s executive compensation is
more likely to be influenced by the performance of the other subsidiaries”).
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current situation in China—“The relentless focus on how
much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real
problem—how CEOs are paid.”77 The “how” indeed has Chinese
characteristics, rather than merely an issue of compensation
composition like in the United States and elsewhere. Understanding
how Chinese executives are paid is a challenging task because it is
not a matter of simply crunching the numbers released in public
companies’ annual reports. A valid reading of formal compensation
figures entails an understanding of the network structure and the
political environment in which Chinese companies operate. An
investigation of the actual practices behind formal compensation
numbers emphasizes the important role of political institutions in
executive compensation, reevaluates China’s latest SOE reform
policy, and highlights the lacuna of extant scholarship on Chinese
executive compensation.

77 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HBR (May-June 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-howmuch-you-pay-but-how [https://perma.cc/8YZW-VXXR].
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